

# Seminar „Soziale Sicherung“

## Ablauf des Seminars und Zeitplan

### Im Vorfeld:

- 23.01.–27.01.2023 Bewerbungszeitraum für das Seminar  
(Seminarbewerbungen bitte als formlose Email an  
[anna.krumme@tu-dortmund.de](mailto:anna.krumme@tu-dortmund.de))
- bis 08.02.2023 Platzzu-/absagen

### Vorlesungsblock:

- 06.04.2023 Vorlesung 1: Theoretische Modelle der sozialen Sicherung I  
13.04.2023 Vorlesung 2: Theoretische Modelle der sozialen Sicherung II  
20.04.2023 Vorlesung 3: Empirische Methoden I  
27.04.2023 Vorlesung 4: Empirische Methoden II

### Bearbeitungszeit:

- 27.04.2023 Themenauswahl
- 27.04.–31.08.2022 Bearbeitungszeitraum
- ca. 29.06.2022 Zwischenpräsentation (individuelle Terminvereinbarung)
- 01.09.2023 (0:00 Uhr) Abgabe der Seminararbeiten per Email an  
[anna.krumme@tu-dortmund.de](mailto:anna.krumme@tu-dortmund.de)
- 07.09.2023 Präsentation der Seminararbeiten (15min + 5min für Fragen)

Die Teilnehmer wählen als Thema der Seminararbeit eins der sieben Themengebiete (aufgeführt unter B auf der nächsten Seite) sowie zusätzlich eine der aufgelisteten Studien, auf die sich in der Seminararbeit besonders fokussiert werden soll.

In der Seminararbeit soll dann auf ungefähr 15 Seiten ein grober Überblick über die Problemfelder und die Forschungsfragen in dem gewählten Themengebiet gegeben werden. Abschließend soll dann das gewählte Papier diskutiert und eingeordnet werden. Die Details folgen dann zum Semesterstart.

### A Grundlagenliteratur für die Vorlesung:

- Chetty, R. and Finkelstein, A. (2013). Social insurance: Connecting theory to data. In *Handbook of Public Economics*, volume 5, pages 111–193. Elsevier

- Angrist, J. D. and Pischke, J.-S. (2008). *Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist's companion*. Princeton University Press

## **B Themengebiete und Paper für die Seminararbeit**

### **i) Krankenversicherung**

- Grundlage: Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., and Levin, J. (2010). Beyond testing: Empirical models of insurance markets. *Annual Review of Economics*, 2(1):311–336
- Finkelstein, A., Taubman, S., Wright, B., Bernstein, M., Gruber, J., Newhouse, J. P., Allen, H., Baicker, K., and Group, O. H. S. (2012). The oregon health insurance experiment: evidence from the first year. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 127(3):1057–1106
- Einav, L. and Finkelstein, A. (2018). Moral hazard in health insurance: What we know and how we know it. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 16(4):957–982
- Card, D., Dobkin, C., and Maestas, N. (2009). Does medicare save lives? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(2):597–636
- Brot-Goldberg, Z. C., Chandra, A., Handel, B. R., and Kolstad, J. T. (2017). What does a deductible do? the impact of cost-sharing on health care prices, quantities, and spending dynamics. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 132(3):1261–1318
- Einav, L. and Finkelstein, A. (2011). Selection in insurance markets: Theory and empirics in pictures. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 25(1):115–38

### **ii) Pflegeversicherung**

- Hernández-Pizarro, H. M., Nicodemo, C., and Casasnovas, G. L. (2020). Discontinuous system of allowances: The response of prosocial health-care professionals. *Journal of Public Economics*, 190:104248
- Kim, H. B. and Lim, W. (2015). Long-term care insurance, informal care, and medical expenditures. *Journal of Public Economics*, 125:128 – 142

### **iii) Arbeitslosenversicherung:**

- Card, D., Chetty, R., and Weber, A. (2007b). The spike at benefit exhaustion: Leaving the unemployment system or starting a new job? *American Economic Review*, 97(2):113–118
- Card, D., Chetty, R., and Weber, A. (2007a). Cash-on-hand and competing models of intertemporal behavior: New evidence from the labor market. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(4):1511–1560

- Schmieder, J. F., von Wachter, T., and Bender, S. (2016). The effect of unemployment benefits and nonemployment durations on wages. *American Economic Review*, 106(3):739–77
- Nekoei, A. and Weber, A. (2017). Does extending unemployment benefits improve job quality? *American Economic Review*, 107(2):527–61

**iv) Rentenversicherung:**

- Chetty, R., Friedman, J. N., Leth-Petersen, S., Nielsen, T. H., and Olsen, T. (2014). Active vs. passive decisions and crowd-out in retirement savings accounts: Evidence from denmark. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(3):1141–1219
- Manoli, D. and Weber, A. (2016). Nonparametric evidence on the effects of financial incentives on retirement decisions. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 8(4):160–82

**v) Arbeitsunfähigkeitsversicherung:**

- Grundlagenpapier: Liebman, J. B. (2015). Understanding the increase in disability insurance benefit receipt in the united states. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 29(2):123–50
- Kostøl, A., Mogstad, M., Setzler, B., et al. (2019). Disability benefits, consumption insurance, and household labor supply. *American Economic Review*, 109(7):2613–54
- Kostøl, A. R. and Mogstad, M. (2015). Earnings, disposable income, and consumption of allowed and rejected disability insurance applicants. *American Economic Review*, 105(5):137–41

**vi) Andere Sozialleistungen des Staates:**

- Olivetti, C. and Petrongolo, B. (2017). The economic consequences of family policies: Lessons from a century of legislation in high-income countries. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 31(1):205–30
- Dahl, G. B., Løken, K. V., Mogstad, M., and Salvanes, K. V. (2016). What is the case for paid maternity leave? *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 98(4):655–670

**vii) Ansätze zur Kosten-Nutzen Evaluation von Staatsausgaben für Sozialleistungen:**

- Hendren, N. and Sprung-Keyser, B. (2020). A unified welfare analysis of government policies. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 135(3):1209–1318
- Finkelstein, A. and Hendren, N. (2020). Welfare analysis meets causal inference. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 34(4):146–67

## Literatur

- Angrist, J. D. and Pischke, J.-S. (2008). *Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist's companion*. Princeton University Press.
- Brot-Goldberg, Z. C., Chandra, A., Handel, B. R., and Kolstad, J. T. (2017). What does a deductible do? the impact of cost-sharing on health care prices, quantities, and spending dynamics. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 132(3):1261–1318.
- Card, D., Chetty, R., and Weber, A. (2007a). Cash-on-hand and competing models of intertemporal behavior: New evidence from the labor market. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(4):1511–1560.
- Card, D., Chetty, R., and Weber, A. (2007b). The spike at benefit exhaustion: Leaving the unemployment system or starting a new job? *American Economic Review*, 97(2):113–118.
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- Chetty, R. and Finkelstein, A. (2013). Social insurance: Connecting theory to data. In *Handbook of Public Economics*, volume 5, pages 111–193. Elsevier.
- Chetty, R., Friedman, J. N., Leth-Petersen, S., Nielsen, T. H., and Olsen, T. (2014). Active vs. passive decisions and crowd-out in retirement savings accounts: Evidence from denmark. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(3):1141–1219.
- Dahl, G. B., Løken, K. V., Mogstad, M., and Salvanes, K. V. (2016). What is the case for paid maternity leave? *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 98(4):655–670.
- Einav, L. and Finkelstein, A. (2011). Selection in insurance markets: Theory and empirics in pictures. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 25(1):115–38.
- Einav, L. and Finkelstein, A. (2018). Moral hazard in health insurance: What we know and how we know it. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 16(4):957–982.
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- Finkelstein, A. and Hendren, N. (2020). Welfare analysis meets causal inference. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 34(4):146–67.
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- Hendren, N. and Sprung-Keyser, B. (2020). A unified welfare analysis of government policies. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 135(3):1209–1318.
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- Kostøl, A. R. and Mogstad, M. (2015). Earnings, disposable income, and consumption of allowed and rejected disability insurance applicants. *American Economic Review*, 105(5):137–41.
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- Manoli, D. and Weber, A. (2016). Nonparametric evidence on the effects of financial incentives on retirement decisions. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 8(4):160–82.
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- Olivetti, C. and Petrongolo, B. (2017). The economic consequences of family policies: Lessons from a century of legislation in high-income countries. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 31(1):205–30.
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